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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from the final judgment of the Third Circuit 
Court in and for Summit County, entered on September 16, 1992, R. 
257-58,l and supplemented by order of December 8, 1992, R. 270-
74, granting summary judgment for appellee and dismissing 
appellant's complaint with prejudice. A notice of appeal was 
timely filed on October 13, 1992, R. 262-63, and an amended 
notice of appeal was filed on December 17, 1992, R. 275-76. This 
Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d).2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether appellee Board 
of Education of the Park City School District ("Board11) was 
obligated, as required by the 1988-1990 Master Contract between 
the Board and appellant Park City Education Association ("PCEA"), 
to provide health insurance coverage during the 1989-90 school 
year for two part-time teachers, and, more specifically, whether 
the trial court erred in holding that paragraph 2.3 of the Master 
Contract — which provides that the terms of that contract are to 
supersede any conflicting Board policies — is invalid as "an 
1
 Citations to the numbered pages of the record on appeal 
are in the form MR. .,f 
2
 This case was originally filed in the district court and 
subsequently transferred to the circuit court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-4(3). See infra p. 3. Section 78-3-4(3) makes 
clear that, under such circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction 
over an appeal from the judgment of the circuit court. 
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unlawful limitation on the Board's legislative authority." R. 
274. 
As this appeal is a challenge to a grant of summary 
judgment, it presents for review only conclusions of law. The 
appellate court grants no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law, but rather reviews them for correctness. 
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 
(Utah 1991). 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-16: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to deny 
the right of employees to bargain collectively with 
their employer [defined as including Mschool 
districts," § 34-34-3] by and through labor unions, 
labor organizations or any other type of associations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-la-302(3) (enacted by the Centennial Schools 
Program Act, H.B. No. 100 (1993) (complete text in Addendum)): 
(a) The school directors may request a waiver from 
the local board of education of any provision in an 
agreement or contract between the district and its 
employees that prevents or hinders the school from 
achieving its performance goals. 
(b) The waiver is subject to agreement between the 
local board and the entity that represented the 
employees in obtaining the agreement or contract 
referred to in Subsection (a). 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(17): 
A [school], board shall do all other things 
necessary for the maintenance, prosperity, and success 
of the schools and the promotion of education. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-411(l): 
A local school board may enter into a written 
employment contract for a term not to exceed five 
years. 
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The text of the Public School Dispute Resolution Act, H.B. 
No. 396 (1993), Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-6-401 to 402, which 
provides a mechanism for resolving impasses in collective 
bargaining between school districts and exclusive bargaining 
representatives of their certificated employees, is set forth in 
the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, 
and Disposition Below 
This action arises from the Board's breach of its 
contractual obligation to provide health insurance coverage for 
part-time teachers during the 1989-90 school year. PCEA seeks an 
award of damages for two part-time teachers who were denied such 
coverage, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. 
PCEA filed its complaint in this action in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Summit County, on April 12, 1990. R. 2-
19. Following discovery, both parties moved for summary 
judgment. The Board also moved to transfer the action to the 
circuit court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(3). The latter 
motion was granted, and the case was transferred to the Third 
Circuit Court, on April 27, 1992. R. 219. Following oral 
argument of the cross-motions for summary judgment before Judge 
Roger A. Livingston on August 4, 1992, R. 256, the court, by 
order of September 16, 1992, granted the Board's motion for 
summary judgment, denied PCEA's motion, and dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice. R. 257-58. 
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On December 8, 1992, the court entered a second order, which 
— consistent with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure — provided a written statement of the ground for the 
court/s decision. R. 270-74. In its opinion, the court held 
that the individual employment contracts the two teachers had 
signed incorporated the terms of a previously adopted Board 
policy that — contrary to the terms of the 1988-1990 Master 
Contract between the Board and PCEA — denied insurance coverage 
to part-time teachers. R. 271-72. In response to PCEA's 
argument that "the master contract by its own terms takes 
precedence over Board policies which conflict with the provisions 
of the master contract," R. 273, the court stated: 
Such a contractual provision would prevent the Board of 
Education from amending its policies regarding 
benefits, compensation, personnel, termination, and 
many other provisions, thus taking away the Board's 
ability to properly and responsibly manage its affairs 
according to statutory requirements and standards. 
Moreover, such a provision would be an unlawful 
limitation on the Board's legislative authority. 
R. 273-74. Therefore, the court concluded that the Board's 
policy with respect to the provision of health insurance was 
valid despite its direct conflict with the provisions of the 
Master Contract. The court accordingly reaffirmed its judgment 
in favor of the Board. R. 274. 
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B» Statement of Facts 
1. The Parties' Collective Bargaining 
Agreement and the Board's Policy 
During the time period relevant to this action — the 1988-
89 and 1989-90 school years — PCEA was recognized by the Board 
as the exclusive bargaining agent for all certified personnel 
employed by the Board (except supervisors, confidential 
employees, substitutes, per diem employees and classified 
employees). R. 51 (5 5), 55-56 (55 1, 3), 204. On September 21, 
1988, the Board and PCEA entered into a two-year agreement, 
entitled "Master Contract 1988-89, 1989-90," to run until 
September 1, 1990. R. 50-51 (5 1), 56 (5 2), 200, 201 (55 2.2, 
2.5). That contract is contained in the record at R. 7-18 and R. 
197-218, and a copy is included in the Addendum to this brief. 
The Master Contract defines the "unit member[s]" to whom it 
applies as "[a]ny full-time, half-time, or part-time teacher." 
R. 200 (5 1.1.3). It expressly sets out its relationship to each 
teacher's individual contract: "This agreement as well as all 
other policies duly promulgated by the Board will be referenced 
in each teacher's yearly contract and be deemed to be a part 
thereof." R. 201 (5 2.2). 
Paragraph 2.3 of the Master Contract addresses, in 
unambiguous terms, the possibility of conflicts between the 
Master Contract and policies adopted unilaterally by the Board: 
2.3 Agreement Supercedes Policy - In case of any 
direct conflict between the express provisions of this 
agreement and any Board of Education policy[,] 
- 6 -
practice, procedure, custom or writing not incorporated 
in this agreement, this agreement shall control* 
R. 201 (1 2.3). 
Among the substantive provisions of the Master Contract, 
"deemed to be a part" of each teacher's individual contract 
pursuant to paragraph 2.2, is the Board's agreement to pay the 
costs of health insurance coverage for each employee in the 
bargaining unit, including part-time teachers. R. 208 (51 5.1, 
5.1.2) .3 
Notwithstanding these provisions of the Master Contract with 
regard to health insurance coverage, the Board on June 27, 1989, 
adopted a new policy — known as "Policy GCDA" — with respect to 
"job sharing" positions in which two or more employees share one 
position. Policy GCDA provides, in relevant part, that "any 
employee contracted for less than 25 hours per week will not be 
eligible for health and accident insurance coverage." R. 109. 
2. The Individual Employment Contracts 
Teachers Nancy Schulthess and Margery Hadden were engaged 
for the 1989-90 school year in half-time, job-sharing positions. 
R. Ill, 113, 117. On June 28, 1989, Ms. Schulthess was informed 
by letter of the Board's approval of her job-sharing arrangement. 
The Board's letter stated that "[y]ou will be issued a formal 
3
 The contract obligates the Board to fund health insurance 
costs (including medical, dental, vision, disability, life 
insurance, and prescription medicines) up to the limit of $197 
per employee/month. Id. 
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contract as soon as negotiations are settled between P.C.E.A. and 
the Park City Board of Education." The letter also recited that 
the position was offered "under the guidelines of the adopted Job 
Share Policy No. GCDA." R. 108. 
Subsequently, on December 12, 1989, Ms. Schulthess signed 
the contract tendered to her by the Board. R. 111. On December 
15, Ms. Hadden signed a similar contract. R. 113. Both 
individual employment contracts contained the following 
paragraph: 
The Board of Education is bound by the adopted rules 
and regulations as stipulated in the policies and 
procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be bound 
by these rules and regulations as they may be amended 
from time to time. 
R. Ill, 113 (fl 5). Despite the requirement of paragraph 2.2 of 
the Master Contract, the individual contracts contained no 
reference to the Master Contract. They were silent, moreover, 
with respect to health insurance coverage. 
When the Board failed to provide health insurance coverage 
for Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden during the 1989-90 school year, 
both teachers incurred certain health care expenses for 
themselves and their dependents, which would otherwise have been 
paid by such insurance. R. 118-20, 123-36, 141-84. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Part-time teachers employed by the Board during the 1989-90 
school year, including Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden, were 
entitled to health insurance coverage pursuant to the terms of 
the Master Contract between the Board and PCEA. The individual 
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contracts signed by Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden incorporate the 
terms of both the Master Contract (which promises insurance 
coverage) and the Board's Policy GCDA (which denies such 
coverage). It is undisputed that, under paragraph 2.3 of the 
Master Contract, it is the terms of the Master Contract that 
control. 
The trial court's holding that paragraph 2.3 of the Master 
Contract constitutes ,fan unlawful limitation on the Board's 
legislative authority" is without foundation in the law. In 
holding that the Board could not lawfully agree that the terms of 
the Master Contract would prevail over unilaterally adopted Board 
policies, the court in effect denied school boards the authority 
to enter into any binding contract. That holding runs contrary 
to the legislature's explicit grant of contracting authority to 
school boards. A, school board does not delegate its authority to 
another party by voluntarily agreeing to contractual terms of 
limited duration, and it may enter into an enforceable collective 
bargaining agreement with the organizational representative of 
its employees. (Part I). 
The principal authorities upon which the Board and the trial 
court relied do not support the court's conclusion. Those 
authorities address the legality of binding arbitration of 
impasses in negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement, 
and of according an employee organization permanent veto power 
over school board policy. Neither is apposite to this case. 
(Part II). 
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The principle that contractually negotiated terms will 
supersede unilaterally adopted policies is inherent in the 
practice of collective bargaining. Utah law clearly contemplates 
that school boards may, in their discretion, negotiate 
enforceable collective bargaining agreements with the 
organizational representative of their teachers. (Part III). 
ARGUMENT 
There can be no doubt that, by its terms, the Master 
Contract required the Board to provide health insurance coverage 
to part-time teachers during the 1989-90 school year. The 
contract unequivocally defines as members of the bargaining unit 
covered by the contract "[a]ny full-time, half-time, or part-time 
teacher." R. 200 (5 1.1.3) (emphasis added). Nothing in the 
contract/s insurance provisions excludes any portion of the 
covered unit from insurance coverage. To the contrary, in the 
introductory paragraph to the contract's Article V on "insurance 
benefits for teachers,11 the Board recites its acknowledgement 
that any employee of the school district has the right 
to receive certain fringe benefits as part of their 
renumeration [sic] for services rendered. Part of that 
remuneration is in the form of insurance benefits both 
medical and life which are provided by the Board of 
Education. 
R. 208 (5 5.1) (emphasis added). Nor is there, elsewhere in the 
contract, any basis for exclusion of any members of the 
bargaining unit from the contract's health insurance provisions.4 
4
 Those provisions specify that the Board was to provide 
insurance coverage within the following limits: 
(continued...) 
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There is no dispute about this reading of the Master 
Contract's language. The application of normal principles of 
contract interpretation to the contract's unambiguous terms makes 
clear that the Board was contractually obligated to provide 
health insurance coverage for part-time teachers during the 1989-
90 school year.5 
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the individual 
employment contracts signed in December 1989 by Ms. Schulthess 
and by Ms. Hadden — which recite that they incorporate by 
reference the policies and procedures adopted by the Board, R. 
4(...continued) 
The District shall fund health insurance costs for 
the 1989-89 [sic] school year (except for that amount 
presently paid by employees for dependent dental 
coverage), up to $197/month/employee. Should health 
insurance costs increasef] over $197/month/employee for 
the 1989-90 school year, the employee would be required 
to fund the increase. The benefits shall include 
medical, dental, vision, disability income insurance, 
life insurance, and presc[r]iption coverage that can be 
obtained through the premium amount of 
$197/month/employee. 
R. 208 (5 5.1.2). 
5
 It is blackletter law that a contractual promise intended 
by the contracting parties to benefit a third party creates a 
contractual duty on the part of the promisor to that third-party 
beneficiary. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989); Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts §§ 302, 304 (1981). Thus, an employer's promise to 
a union in a collective bargaining agreement, intended to benefit 
the employees covered by that agreement, creates an enforceable 
obligation running from the employer to the third-party 
beneficiary employees. Restatement § 302 illus. 14; Jefferson 
County School Dist. No. R-l v. Shorey, 826 P.2d 830, 843 (Colo. 
1992) ; Goldies, Inc. v. Alaska Hotel & Restaurant Employees 
Health & Welfare Fund, 622 P.2d 979, 980 (Alaska 1981). That 
obligation is enforceable by either the union or the employees. 
Restatement § 305(1). 
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111, 113 (5 5) — in no way relieve the Board of its obligation 
to those two teachers under the Master Contract, Indeed, the 
Master Contract itself expressly contemplates that it will be 
supplemented by an individual employment contract for each 
teacher, and it specifies the relationship between the two 
contracts in the following terms: 
This agreement [i,e,, the Master Contract] as well as 
all other policies duly promulgated by the Board will 
be referenced in each teacher's yearly contract and be 
deemed to be a part thereof. 
R. 201 (5 2.2). The terms of both the Master Contract and the 
Board's policies are thus made a part of each teacher's 
individual contract,6 and the determinative question is how to 
resolve the direct conflict between the terms of the Master 
Contract and the Board's Policy GCDA — the former providing that 
all teachers, including part-time teachers, will receive health 
insurance coverage, and the latter denying such coverage to 
teachers employed for less than 25 hours per week. 
The answer is given by paragraph 2.3 of the Master Contract, 
which provides that M[i]n case of any direct conflict between the 
express provisions of this agreement and any Board of Education 
policy . . . not incorporated in this agreement, this agreement 
6
 In point of fact, the Board failed to comply with its 
obligation under paragraph 2.2 to reference the Master Contract 
in the individual contracts it tendered to Ms. Schulthess and Ms. 
Hadden. See R. Ill, 113. Obviously, however, the Board could 
not, by its unilateral breach of that formal requirement, alter 
the Master Contract's substantive provision that the terms of 
that agreement are deemed included in the teachers' individual 
contracts. 
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shall control." R. 201 (J 2.3) (emphasis added).7 It is thus 
the terms of the Master Contract that governed the eligibility of 
Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden for health insurance coverage 
during the 1989-90 school year, and under that contract the Board 
was required to provide such insurance coverage. 
The trial court did not dispute that this conclusion 
followed from the application of paragraph 2.3. Its grant of 
summary judgment for the Board was based, rather, on its 
conclusion that this clause was "an unlawful limitation on the 
Board's legislative authority." R. 274. "Such a contractual 
provision," said the court, "would prevent the Board of Education 
from amending its policies regarding benefits, compensation, 
personnel, termination, and many other provisions, thus taking 
away the Board's ability to properly and responsibly manage its 
affairs according to statutory requirements and standards." R. 
7
 This is not to suggest that the individual employment 
contracts are unenforceable, or that there exists a conflict 
between those contracts and the Master Contract. The individual 
contracts incorporate the Board's "policies and procedures," but 
only to the extent that such policies are valid. As the health 
insurance provisions of Policy GCDA are in direct conflict with 
the Board's obligations under the Master Contract, those GCDA 
provisions are invalid as to employees covered by the Master 
Contract and thus are not incorporated into the individual 
contracts. 
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273-74.8 As we now show, that conclusion is legally unsound and 
must be rejected. 
I. 
The clause the trial court found objectionable in the Master 
Contract provides simply that the provisions of that contract 
supersede any policies adopted unilaterally by one of the 
contracting parties. That notion is so central to the concept of 
a contract that it is almost superfluous. Surely any contractor 
— whether a supplier of goods, an individual contracting to 
supply services, or a union negotiating a collective bargaining 
agreement — is entitled to presume that its contractual partner 
will not be permitted to alter unilaterally the terms of the 
bargain during the term of the agreement. That is so even if one 
party to the contract is a governmental entity.9 
In declaring such a clause an unlawful limitation on the 
Board's authority, the trial court's ruling in effect denies 
school boards the authority to enter into any binding contract, 
8
 The trial court did not address paragraph 2.2, under which 
the provisions of the Master Contract are deemed part of the 
teachers' individual contracts. Even assuming that paragraph 2.3 
was indeed invalid, the court was still faced with a direct 
conflict between the health insurance provisions of the Master 
Contract and of Policy GCDA — both of which were incorporated by 
reference into the teachers' individual employment contracts. 
The trial court's opinion offers no basis for choosing the latter 
over the former. 
9
 The principle that, except in unusual circumstances, 
governmental entities may not unilaterally abrogate their 
contractual undertakings is protected by the contract clauses to 
the United States and Utah Constitutions. See U.S. Const, art. 
I, § 10, cl. 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 18; United States Trust Co. 
v. New Jersey. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
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and that result is directly contrary to the law of this state. 
School boards routinely enter into contracts with their employees 
(as with other parties), and when they do so they necessarily 
give up a certain measure of their discretion to change their 
policies during the term of such contracts. It is beyond dispute 
that the legislature has granted school boards the authority to 
do this, and that the exercise of that authority does not result 
in an unlawful delegation. Thus, for example, the legislature 
has explicitly authorized local school boards to "enter into a 
written employment contract for a term not to exceed five years." 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-411(l).10 By definition, such a contract, 
during its term, "prevent[s] the Board of Education from amending 
its policies regarding benefits, compensation, personnel, 
termination, and many other provisions," R. 273, with respect to 
the contracting party or parties. Section 53A-3-411 stands for 
the proposition that a school board may so limit itself for a 
period of up to five years.11 
10
 Even apart from that explicit authority, school boards 
have broad powers to "do all . . . things necessary for the 
maintenance, prosperity, and success of the schools and the 
promotion of education." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(17). These 
powers, which have been characterized as "plenary," Ricker v. 
Board of Education. 16 Utah 2d 106, 110, 396 P.2d 416, 420 
(1964), "vest in boards of education the entire control of the 
public school system . . . ." Beard v. Board of Education, 81 
Utah 51, 59, 16 P.2d 900, 903-04 (1932). 
11
 There is no logical reason to believe that the authority 
to enter into employment contracts applies only to contracts with 
single individuals. The Board's general authorization to 
contract surely carries with it a measure of discretion to 
determine what form of contract will most efficiently serve the 
school district's interests. As one commentator has observed: 
(continued...) 
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In the analogous case of Littleton Education Ass'n v. 
Arapahoe County School District. 553 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1976), the 
Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that a collective bargaining 
agreement between a school board and the organizational 
representative of its employees is enforceable, and does not 
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. 
Observing that school boards in Colorado had been granted the 
authority to contract, id. at 796-97, the court explained: 
The defect in the board's position that the 
subject agreement constitutes an unlawful delegation of 
authority and places control of a school system in the 
hands of an employee organization reflects a basic 
misperception of the negotiations process. 
Negotiations between an employer and an employee 
organization entered into voluntarily, as in this case, 
do not require the employer to agree with the proposals 
submitted by employees. Rather, the ultimate decisions 
regarding employment terms and conditions remain 
exclusively with the board. While the employees' 
11
 (.. .continued) 
If a public employer has the authority to execute 
individual employment contracts and is interested in 
efficiency and administrative simplicity, those 
individual contracts will contain standardized terms. 
Once one realizes that contracts negotiated for the 
same kind of work . . . are subject to standardization, 
it becomes apparent that a general power to contract 
can fairly encompass powers to confer exclusive 
recognition and execute collective bargaining 
contracts. A collective bargaining contract is 
essentially a master contract which sets the terms and 
conditions of employment for individual employees 
without requiring formal negotiation of these matters 
with each employee. If a public employer can 
standardize individual contracts of employment, it 
should also be able to utilize the more efficient 
master contract negotiated with an employee 
representative to achieve the same result. 
Richard F. Dole, Jr., State and Local Public Employee Collective 
Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorizationf 
54 Iowa L. Rev* 539, 545-46 (1969)• 
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influence is permitted and felt, the control of 
decisionmaking has not been abrogated or delegated. 
Id. at 796. 
Similarly, in Louisiana Teachers7 Ass'n v. Orleans Parish 
School Board, 303 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1974), the court said 
in upholding a school board's authority to engage in collective 
bargaining: 
The Board . . . retains the right of final decision as 
to what terms and conditions it will agree to. Indeed, 
it retains the right to decide not to agree at all. 
Once an agreement is reached, of course, the Board 
cannot violate the agreement or withdraw its consent. 
But this applies to any agreement, whether reached by 
collective bargaining or by any other means. . . . 
Inasmuch as the Board has not surrendered any 
decision-making authority, we conclude there has been 
no unlawful delegation. 
Id. at 568 & n.6 (footnote arranged in text); see also Dayton 
Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Board of Education, 323 N.E.2d 
714, 716-17 (Ohio 1975) .12 
II. 
The trial court cited no authority in support of its holding 
that paragraph 2.3 of the Master Agreement constituted an 
unlawful limitation on the Board's authority. The court's 
opinion does, however, generally follow the Board's reply brief 
in support of its summary judgment motion, compare R. 273-74 with 
12
 A similar point is made by Dole, supra: "Because a public 
employer does not have to agree to an employee representative's 
proposals, a public employer delegates no authority to a 
representative by attempting to negotiate a collective bargaining 
contract. Furthermore, any agreement that results is an exercise 
of discretion rather than a delegation of authority by the public 
employer." 54 Iowa L. Rev. at 543-44. 
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R. 231-32, which relied principally upon two authorities: Salt 
Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1977), and Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 86-40 (Aug. 11, 1986). 
See R. 232-34. Neither of these authorities supports the court's 
conclusion. 
In the Salt Lake City case, the court examined a provision 
of the Utah Fire Fighters' Negotiation Act that provided for 
mandatory, binding arbitration of issues not resolved in 
bargaining between the firefighters' organizational 
representative and municipal authorities. As the statute placed 
the ultimate decision of such issues in the hands of a panel of 
arbitrators, not accountable to the public, the court held it to 
be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, 
contrary to Article VI, § 28, of the Utah Constitution. 563 P.2d 
at 789-90. 
That, however, is not this case. The Master Contract 
between the Board and PCEA contains no provision delegating any 
portion of the Board's legislative authority to PCEA, to an 
arbitrator, or to any other body.13 It is, rather, simply a 
contract for a definite term, entered into by the Board in the 
exercise of its discretion. 
13
 The Master Contract does contain a provision for the 
voluntary arbitration of grievances arising out of the contract, 
subject to the agreement of both the Board and the aggrieved 
party in each instance. See R. 203 (5 3.3.6). Such "grievance 
arbitration11 should be distinguished from "interest arbitration" 
— the arbitration of impasses in the negotiation of the contract 
itself — that was at issue in Salt Lake City. In any event, the 
legality of the grievance arbitration clause in the Master 
Contract is not at issue in this case. 
- 18 -
The distinction is illustrated by a pair of Colorado cases, 
decided in tandem by the supreme court of that state. In Greeley 
Police Union v. City Council, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1976), the 
court overturned as an unconstitutional delegation a city charter 
amendment containing the same kind of provision for binding 
arbitration of public sector labor disputes as was at issue in 
Salt Lake City. On the same day, however, the court upheld the 
collective bargaining agreement in Littleton, supra, stating that 
"a school board's participation in collective bargaining is not 
per se an unlawful delegation of its authority.11 Littleton, 553 
P.2d at 797. Distinguishing the two cases, the court explained 
that "[t]he collective bargaining agreement in Littleton . . . 
did not contain binding arbitration features. The board of 
education was not required to surrender any of its ultimate 
decision-making authority.11 Greeleyr 553 P.2d at 792. The 
apposite case here is Littleton, not Greeley or Salt Lake City. 
The Board also relied for its argument below on Attorney 
General Opinion No. 86-40. The delegation problem in that case 
was somewhat different from the problem presented in Salt Lake 
City. In Opinion No. 86-40, a school board adopted a policy 
governing the terms and conditions of teachers' employment; that 
policy provided that it could be amended only with the agreement 
of the education association that represented the teachers. As 
far as appears from the Attorney General's opinion, the provision 
in question was not part of a contract entered into by the school 
board for a limited term; rather, it purported to bind the board 
indefinitely — or until the education association agreed to 
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permit a change. In other words, the association was accorded a 
permanent veto power over any policy change. 
As in Salt Lake City, the policy at issue in Opinion No. 86-
40 unlawfully delegated a portion of the Board's legislative 
authority to an outside body. In the present case, by contrast, 
the Board has delegated nothing; rather, it has voluntarily 
entered into a limited-term employment contract within the bounds 
of the contracting authority conferred upon it by law. Thus, 
neither of the authorities upon which the Board relied and upon 
which the trial court's opinion presumably rests speaks to the 
point at issue in this case. 
III. 
Finally, implicit in the very notion of collective 
bargaining is the principle embodied in paragraph 2.3 of the 
Master Contract that contractually negotiated terms will 
supersede any policy either party might unilaterally adopt. As 
it is clear that Utah law permits school districts and teacher 
representatives to bargain collectively, it follows that it was 
within the Board's authority to agree to the terms of paragraph 
2.3. 
In 1986 the Attorney General addressed the legality of 
collective bargaining by school districts, concluding that "a 
school district has discretion over the question of whether to 
enter into the collective bargaining process," and that the 
school board could permissibly exercise that discretion "by 
dealing exclusively with the recognized representative" of the 
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teachers. Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 85-73 (Mar. 11, 1986).14 While 
it was thus within the Board's discretion to decide whether or 
not to engage in collective bargaining, the Attorney General's 
opinion made clear that any collective bargaining agreement a 
school board chose to conclude was binding upon it: MIf the 
Board has previously exercised that discretion in a duly 
negotiated agreement . . . , then the Board should abide [by] the 
terms of the agreement for its duration.11 Id. 
The Attorney General returned to this question in a 
subsequent opinion in 1988. While finding it unnecessary to pass 
definitively on the legality of collective bargaining at that 
time, the Attorney General observed that Hit can be argued that 
in Utah the decision to recognize and bargain with a union or 
association is within the well considered discretion of the local 
board of education and is neither prohibited nor 
required . . . .H Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 88-002 (June 13, 
1988). That conclusion was based on the existence of collective 
bargaining as a "long standing practice,11 together with the 
provision of the Right to Work law which provides that nothing 
therein should "be construed to deny the right of employees to 
14
 The limits of a school board's discretion, said the 
Attorney General, were marked by the provisions of the Right to 
Work law, which "require[d] school districts to avoid any 
agreement or practice which would deny a person's right to work 
or which attempts to compel or force any person to join or 
refrain from joining any employee union or association." Op. No. 
85-73 (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-34-1, 34-34-5, 34-34-6). 
Neither paragraph 2.3 nor anything else in the Master Contract 
between the Board and PCEA denies any person the right to work or 
compels any person to join a union or other association. 
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bargain collectively with their employer by and through labor 
unions, labor organizations or any other type of associations." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-16.15 
More recent statutory enactments make even clearer the 
legislative intent that school boards be permitted to engage in 
collective bargaining. First, in enacting the Centennial Schools 
Program, Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-la-301 et seg. (H.B. No. 100), the 
1993 session of the Utah Legislature provided that the school 
directors of a participating school could "request a waiver from 
the local board of education of any provision in an agreement or 
contract between the district and its employees that prevents or 
hinders the school from achieving its performance goals." Utah 
Code Ann. § 53A-la-302(3)(a). However, such a waiver was made 
"subject to agreement between the local board and the entity that 
represented the employees in obtaining the agreement or contract 
15
 The Attorney General noted in passing the existence of 
dicta in Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 1981), to the 
effect that "public employees in this state generally have no 
collective bargaining rights." Id. at 174 (citing Westly v. 
Board of Citv Commissioners. 573 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1978)). While 
that statement was sufficiently terse that its meaning cannot be 
discerned with certainty, it appears from the facts of the case 
that the courts intent was merely to reject the contention that 
public employers could be compelled to bargain collectively (as 
can private-sector employers under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(5), and the Utah Labor Relations Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-8(1)(d)). That conclusion is both 
undisputed and irrelevant here. In any case, the Pratt dicta was 
offered without analysis and after the court had disposed of the 
case before it on other grounds. Nor does Westlyr the cited 
precedent, support the position that public employees may not 
engage in collective bargaining; it simply rejects the argument 
that a particular statute — the preamble to the Labor Disputes 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-19-1 — conferred certain substantive 
rights, without addressing the more general question. See 573 
P.2d at 1279-80. 
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referred to in Subsection (a).H Utah Code Ann. § 53A-la-
302(3)(b). These provisions not only recognize implicitly the 
validity of collectively bargained agreements between school 
boards and employee organizations, but also confirm the binding 
character of such contracts. Section 302(3)(b) would be utterly 
superfluous if a school board was free to adopt unilaterally 
policies at odds with a collectively bargained agreement. 
The 1993 session of the Utah Legislature also adopted the 
Public School Dispute Resolution Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-6-401 
et seq. (H.B. No. 396), which provides mediation and factfinding 
procedures as a means of facilitating the resolution of labor 
disputes in education. The act envisions contract negotiations 
between a school board and the "professional local organization 
which represents a majority of the certificated employees of a 
school district," § 53A-6-401(l), which it elsewhere refers to as 
the "exclusive representative," § 53A-6-*402 (8) . It also provides 
a procedure for determination of the majority status of such a 
professional organization, § 53A-6-402(9). Thus, while the Act 
does not itself establish collective bargaining between school 
boards and teacher associations, it clearly presupposes the 
existence and legality of collective bargaining in the field of 
public education. 
In short, Utah law clearly contemplates that a school board 
may, in its discretion, negotiate a collectively bargained 
agreement with the association representing its teachers, and 
that such a collective bargaining agreement is enforceable. 
Thus, there is no basis in law for the trial court's holding that 
- 23 -
the Master Contract clause binding the Board to the terms of the 
contract it negotiated with PCEA was unlawful. 
As the provisions of the Master Contract are controlling 
with respect to the Board's obligation to provide health 
insurance coverage to part-time teachers, Ms. Schulthess and Ms. 
Hadden were entitled to such coverage during the school year 
1989-90. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial 
court dismissing PCEA's complaint should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the circuit court with instructions to deny the 
Board's motion for summary judgment, grant PCEA's motion for 
summary judgment, and enter judgment in favor of PCEA. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT H. CHANIN 
JOHN M. WEST 
Bredhoff & Kaiser 
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Suite 1300 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 833-9340 
MICHAEL T. MCCOY (2165) 
875 East 5180 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801) 266-4461 
Counsel for Appellant 
Park City Education Association 
A D D E N D U M 
Contents 
1. Board of Education Policy GCDA 
2. Individual employment contracts 
3. Master Contract 1988-89, 1989-90 
4. Trial court's Conclusions of Law and 
Order (Dec. 8, 1992) 
5. Centennial Schools Program Act, 1993 
(H.B. No. 100) 
6* Public School Dispute Resolution 
Act, 1993 (H.B. No. 396) 
Adopted June 2 / , 1939 Policy Code GCDA 
JOB SHARING 
Job sharing is a voluntary program providing two or more employees the opportunity to share 
one position. In cases where it is mutually advantageous to both the school district and 
employees, a jcb-sharing arrangement may be implemented. Wages, fringe benefits, and all 
other benefits shall be prorated on the basis of the time worked as a percent of a full-time 
equivalent position. However, any employee contracted for less than 25 hours per week will not 
be eligible for health and accident insurance coverage. Employees working less than full-time 
will not receive credit for a step increase on the salary schedule the next school year. 
Employees working at least one half-time F.T.E. will receive one full step every two years. 
Teachers who job share should generally teach each day, either morning or afternoon. It will 
not be deemed apprcpriate to adopt schedules which anticipate long absences of teachers; i.e. 
extended vacations, or additional personal days. Whenever a sharing teacher is absent from 
his/her work as per the pre-arranged schedule, a record of his/her absence will be maintained 
by the principal's office and reported to the payroll office. All absences will be recorded. 
To assure an orderly process, an application must be submitted no later than the following dates: 
January 15 - Written proposal submitted to principal for the position starting 
at the beginning of the next school year. Each request is for one school year only. 
If applicants are presently sharing a position, they will need to apply each year 
for the continuation of the job-sharing position. All applicants for each position 
must apply as a team. 
February 7 - Written proposal with principal's recommendation submitted to 
the superintendent of schools, 
March - At the, first regular Board of Education meeting the written proposal 
with both the principal and superintendent's recommendation will be submitted 
to the Board, 
April 15 - Approval or rejection of written proposal by the Board of Education. 
If a teacher decides he/she would like to share one position and can find another teacher already 
within their school, they should contact their principal before January 15th. If a teacher 
within their school is not interested in job sharing and one teacher would like to find another 
teacher in a school within the district, or outside the district, Policy GCD and Policy GCI will be 
followed. 
Upon Board approval, each applicant must sign a job-share contract for the shared position. 
Each applicant must agree to return to full-time status in the event one of the participants in a 
shared job is unable to continue in the shared assignment. If a teacher on a job-share contract 
is granted a leave of absence, the shared assignment becomes null and void. Each applicant for a 
job-sharing position must be certified to teach those subjects/grade levels involved in ihe 
shared job. If the teachers or the Board decide to discontinue the job-sharing position at the end 
of a school year, and if there is no other comparable position available in the School District, 
the Board will decide which of the two teachers to retain in accordance with the policies and 
criteria set forth in the Reduction of Professional Staff Work Force Policy, adopted 9/13/88. 
Time necessary for coordination of teaching assignment responsibilities shall be performed on 
the job-sharing teachers' time and not the district's. When teachers have the responsibility for 
the same students both teachers must attend parent/teacher conferences. Both members of 
job-sharing team must attend ail faculty meetings, in-service activities, and any other school 
activity requiring other teachers attendance. 
> • EDUCATIONAL EXC£LL 
Park City Schools 
1250 Iron Horse Onve P.O. 3ox 630310 Par* City, Utah S4063 (801)649-9671 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR CERTIFIED STAFF 
One Year Job Share Contract 
Nancy Schulth^ss 
P. 0 . Box 680741 
Park City, UT 84063 
The Park City School District Board of Education and the undersigned employee hereby enter 
into an employment contract for the 1989-90 school year based on the certified salary schedule 
LANE: BS, STEP: 4, and a FULL-TIME EQUIVALENCY OF: 0.50. Attached is a 1989-
90 salary schedule. 
1 . The contract will be for the minimum 184 working days as adopted by the Board of 
Education, 
2 . In addition, you may- be eligible for additional salary. 
3. In the event you have completed less than three (3) consecutive years with the Park City 
School District, your status will be that of a provisional employee. 
4. This contract is void if a valid and appropriate Utah teaching certificate was not on file 
by November 1, 1989. 
5. The Board of Education is bound by the adopted rules and regulations as stipulated in the 
policies and procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be bound by these rules and 
regulations as theyjnay be amended from time to time. s as tneyjnay be a er 
A t t a c h ent _, 
#***' I ( 
Park City Board President Employee q 
' h-io-Zf 
Date 
> / EDUCATIONAL EXCc'-Liu 
Park City Schools 
1250 Iron Horsa Orive P.O. Box 53O310 Part City, Utah S4C63 (801)649-9671 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR CERTIFIED STAFF 
One Year Job Share Contract •?^°OSHB7T )N 
Margery Hadden * * 
520 Parkview Drive 
Park City, UT 84060 
The Park City School District Board of Education and the undersigned employee hereby enter 
into an employment contract for the 1989-90 school year based on the certified salary schedule 
LANE: BS + 55, STEP: 7, and a FULL-TIME EQUIVALENCY OF: 0.50. Attached is a 
1989-90 salary schedule. 
1 . The contract will be for the minimum 184 working days as adopted by the Board of 
Education. 
2. In addition, you may be eligible for additional salary. 
3. In the event you have completed less than three (3) consecutive years with the Park City 
School District, your status will be that of a provisional employee. 
4 . This contract is void if a valid and appropriate Utah teaching certificate was not on file 
by November 1, 1989. 
5. The Board of Education is bound by the adopted rules and regulations as stipulated in the 
policies and procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be bound by these rules and 
regulations as they may be amended from time to time. 
Attachrtfent s ^ / , Z 
Park City Board President Employe^ f l 
laJ/xkq 
Date '' ' 
Oh / . l O v r r / ! / 1 / . , , J/) , A !.< /-A $r\A }*C\ ?/V>>J.ZU 
X" 
MASTER CONTRACT 
1988'89 1989'90 
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MASTER CONTRACT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into by and between PARK CITY BOARD 
OF EDUCATION (hereinafter called the "Board-) and the PARK CITY 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (hereinafter called the -Association") this 
day, the 21st of September, 1988. 
The Board and the Association recognize that providing a high quality 
education for the children of Park City School District is the 
paramount objective and shared responsibility of the Board, 
Administration, teachers and other staff of the Park City School 
District. In doing this, it is understood that: 
Attainment of the objectives of the educational program conducted in 
the Park City School District requires mutual understanding and 
cooperation between the Board and the Association. To this end, 
negotiation, in good faith between the Board and the Association with 
a free and open exchange of views, are desirable. 
ARTICLE I - RECOGNITION 
1.1.1 Board - The term "Board" shall Include its officers and 
agents. The Board is elected by the qualified electors of the School 
District as the governing body of the School District and, as such, 
possesses all powers delegated to a board of education or to a school 
district by the Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah, together 
with the duties imposed thereby. 
1.1.2 Superintendent - The term "Superintendent" shall include the 
Superintendent and his/her designee. The Superintendent is the chief 
executive officer of the Board, and as such, administers the affairs 
and programs of the School District as provided by law and Board 
policy. 
1.1.3 Unit Member - Any full-time, half-time, or part-time 
teacher. Teachers have the major role in direct contact with pupils; 
therefore, the high morale of well qualified teachers who are able to 
teach in a productive environment provided by the Board, is a 
necessity for the best education of the children. 
ARTICLE II - STATUS OF AGREEMENT 
•1 Limitation of Board Powers - The Board has certain powers, 
discretions and duties, that under the Constitution and Laws of the 
State of Utah, may not be delegated, limited or abrogated by agreement 
with any party. Accordingly, if any provision of this agreement, or 
OOOiUU 
any application of this agreement to any teacher covered hereby shall 
be found contrary to law, such provision or application shall have 
effect only to the extent permitted by lav, but all other provisions 
or applications of this agreement shall continue in full force and 
effect* 
2.2 Agreement Continuing Contract - This agreement as well as 
all other policies duly promulgated by the Board will be referenced in 
each teacher's yearly contract and be deemed to be a part thereof. 
The Park City School District Board of Education proposes a two-year 
contract for the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school years. The two-year 
contract would include provisions fort step increases and lane 
changes, continuation of a 184 day teacher contract, and the district 
to fund... health insurance cost for the 1988-89 year. Should health 
'insusr_ance" costs increase over the $197/month/employee for the 1989-90 
scKool year, the employee would be required to fund the increase. 
If the district realizes any new revenues during the 1988-89 school 
year other than the RDA payment, PCEA reserves the right to open 
negotiations for teacher compensation for the 1989-90 school year* 
2.3 Agreement Supercedes Policy - In case of any direct conflict 
between the express provisions of this agreement and any Board of 
Education policy practice, procedure, custom or writing not 
incorporated in this agreement, this agreement shall control. 
2.4 Alterations of Agreement - Changes in any section of this 
agreement (basic rules, policy, administrative items, shared 
governance) shall be made only through established procedures of 
negotiation, and not be either a unilateral decision by the parties or 
by informal agreement* between administrators and officers or agents of 
the Association and shall prevail until new agreements are made. 
2.4.1. Changes and Improvements of the Park City Master Contract 
shall be ongoing during the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school year. PCEA 
will continue to request changes in the Master Contract and shall 
request that a monthly meeting be scheduled with the District 
personnel and Board members in order to suggest changes and 
improvements. 
2.5 Duration - The provisions of this agreement will be 
effective upon ratification and will continue and remain in full force 
and effect from September 1 to September 1. Any changes of this 
provision shall occur during good faith negotiations and may continue 
for 90 school days beyond the September 1st deadline. Any provision of 
this agreement may be renegotiated any time upon the request of either 
the Board or the Association. If either party does not wish to 
renegotiate the item it shall become on item for negotiation at the 
formal negotiations session. 
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ARTICLE III - Grievance Procedure 
3.1 Purpose - The purpose of this procedure is to secure, at the 
lowest possible administrative level, equitable solutions to 
grievances which may arise. Both parties agree that these proceedings 
shall be kept informal and confidential at any level of the procedure. 
All parties shall cooperate and act in good faith to resolve the 
grievance. 
3.2 Definition - A claim based upon an event or condition which 
affects the welfare or conditions of employment of a teacher or group 
of teachers and/or the interpretation, meaning, or application of any 
provision of employment. A claim based upon an event or condition 
which does not affect the welfare or conditions of employment of a 
district employee, shall not constitute a grievance. 
3.2.1 Aggrieved Person - An "Aggrieved Person" is the person or 
persons making the claim. The Association may be an "aggrieved 
Person" in instances where an alleged contract violation affects the 
Association or a clearly defined class of unit members. 
3.2.2 Party in Interest - A "party in interest" is the person or 
persons who might be required to take action or against whom action 
might be taken in order to resolve the claim. 
3.3 Procedures 
3.3.1 Time Limits, Filing of Grievance - A grievance must be filed 
within 15 school days of the grievance event. The time limit may be 
extended by mutual written agreement. 
3.3.2. Informal Resolution - Before presenting a written grievance, 
the aggrieved person shall first discuss the grievance with the 
administrator or person with whom he/she has the grievance, with the 
objective of resolving the matter in an informal manner. 
The unit member shall notify the Association and a representative of 
the Association shall be given the opportunity to be present at any 
meeting under this section. 
3.3.3. Formal Action - Level I - If the grievance cannot be solved 
informally * 
A. A formal written grievances must be filed with 
the school adroinistor or immediate supervisor. 
B. The formal grievance shall be answered within 
five (5) school days after receipt. 
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C. The aggrieved shall accept or reject the 
decision rendered within five (5) school days. If 
rejected, the grievance is referred to the 
Superintendent. If the grievance is not answered 
within the prescribed time limit, it is 
automatically appealed to the Superintendent* 
3.3.4. Formal Action - Level II * Superintendent 
B. Within fifteen (15) school days after the 
receipt of the written grievance by the 
Superintendent, the Superintendent shall meet with 
the aggrieved person to resolve it. The 
Superintendent shall render a decision within five 
(5) school days of the meeting. 
3.3.5. Formal Action - Level III - Board of Education 
A. Appeal to Board of Education - If the 
aggrieved person is not satisfied with the 
disposition of his/her grievance at Level II it 
may be appealed to the Board of Education. 
B* Bypass to Superintendent - If the aggrieved 
and the Superintendent agree, any step of the 
grievance procedure may be bypassed and the 
grievance brought directly to the next step. 
3.3.6. Bypass to Arbitration - If both the Board and the aggrieved 
agree, a greivance may be submitted to arbitration. 
Mlscellaneous 
3.4. Representation - Any party in interest may be represented and/or 
accompanied at all formal stages of the grievance procedure by the 
Association or other appropriate person of his/her own choosing* 
3.4.1. Reprisals Prohibited - No reprisals of any kind shall be 
taken by either party or by any member of the Administration or the 
Association against any party in interest, any school representative, 
or any other participant in the grievance procedure by reason of such 
participation. 
3.4.2. Separate Grievance File - All documents, communications and 
records dealing with the processing of a grievance shall not be filed 
n the personnel files of the participants, nor should a separate file 
-je made to contain such information. 
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LANGUAGE AGREED DURING MONTHLY NEGOTIATIONS 
Exclusive Representative* The Board hereby recognizes the Park 
City Education Association n the exclusive representative of all 
certified personnel, except for supervisory and confidential 
personnel, substitutes, per diem ' employees, and classified 
employees. 
Grievance Procedureei Add to current language 
3.3.3. 
X. 
B. 
Within 20 days of the aggrieved person's knowledge 
of an act, omiaslon or event giving rise to the 
grievance• 
This statement ahall consist of clear and concise 
statement of the grievance, the deciaion rendered, 
if any, at the informal conference, and the 
•pacific relief requeeted. It ehall be signed by 
the eggrleved person. 
3.3.5 
A. Such appeal ahall be made in writing within five 
(5) working days after e decision by the 
Superintendent, or if no decision has been 
rendered by the Superintendent within five (5) 
working days, after the Superintendent hearing. 
B. The appeal shall include a copy of the original 
grievance, the decision rendered by the principal 
or Superintendent, a clear, concise statement of 
the reasons for the appeal and the specific relief 
requested• 
C. The Board shall hold a hearing on the appeal not 
later than its second board meeting following the 
filing of the notice of appeal from the 
Superintendent's decision. 
D. If the Board finds that it cannot reach a proper 
decision, it may ask for additional evidence. The 
Board shall allow for oral argument by the partial 
in Interest or their representatives. 
The Board shall render its decision In writing to 
the parties not later than twenty (20) working 
days after the close of the hearing. 
3.3.6* Bypass to Superintendent. 
Master Contract. 
Same as B under 3.3.5. in 
3•3 • 7 » Bypaaa to Arbitration. 
Contract. 
Same as in Hester 
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ARTICLE IV - SALARIES AND SCHEDULE PLACEMENT 
4.1 Professional Salary Schedule - Unit members are paid 
according to a salary schedule as negotiated and ratified by the 
Association and the Board. All University, Inservice, and Non-
University credit for salary advancement shall be counted as quarter 
hours. Semester hours will count as 1 1/2 hours per quarter hour. 
4.2 Verlflcaiton of Salary - Unit members covered by this 
agreement shall receive a copy of the current negotiated teacher's 
salary schedule not including supplemental career ladder money or 
bonuses and verification of placement on the salary schedule. 
4.3 Appointment on Salary Schedule - For initial appointment on 
the salary schedule, a unit member must comply with the following: 
A. Unit members must be fully certificated as 
prescribed by law and the rules and regulations of 
the Utah State Board of Education. 
B. Teachers new to the district will receive a 
year's credit for each successful teaching year 
outside the district up to a maximum of six (6) 
years credit would place them on Step 7 on the 
salary schedule. 
4.4. No unit member may begin or be placed on the MS • 45 (Ed. 
Specialist) lane until he/she has completed three successful years of 
teaching, one of which must be in the Park City School District. 
4.5. Additional Training - Adjustments in salary lanes due to 
completion of additional training will be made effective the first 
working day of the school year, providing the credits are 
appropriately submitted to the school district office before the start 
of that school year. 
4.5.1 Lane Change Qualificaiton - A teacher desiring to qualify 
for a lane change must submit to the District office: 
A. A listing of the credits to be counted towards 
the lane change. 
B. Explanation or justification of credits where 
considered necessary. 
C. Official transcripts of credits. 
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4.5.2 Criteria for Credit - Criteria for additional credit 
allowance shall be as follows: 
A. Courses - Classes based on the following 
criteria will be granted acceptance of credit for 
salary lane changes: 
1. Courses in the area of teaching 
major or minor 
2. Courses in the area of present 
teaching assignment 
3. Courses that meet the district goals 
or needs. 
B. Graduate Degrees - All graduate degree credits 
which meet the above criteria will be accepted for 
lane change. Completion of the advanced degree 
from an accredited institution shall place the 
person on the appropriate lane. 
C. University Credit - University credit, either 
undergraduate or graduate, must be approved for 
compliance with established criteria by the 
District. Credit to be applied toward the 
Bachelor's plus 30 and the Bachelor's plus 55 
lanes must have been earned subsequent to meeting 
the requirements for the Bachelor's degree. 
Credit to be applied to the Master's plus 45 lane 
must have been earned subsequent to meeting the 
requirements for the Master's degree. 
D. Nonuniversity Credits - Upon recommendation of 
the Lane Change Committee, and by approval of the 
Superintendent, nonuniversity or noncollege credit 
may qualify for lane advancement on the salary 
schedule. The amount of such credit shall be 
limited to a maximum of six (6) quarter hours for 
any one lane change. All of these credit hours 
must be directly related to the teacher's current 
assignment. Each quarter hour should be 
equivalent to 20 hours of in-class instruction. 
It is recommended that the teacher planning for 
nonuniversity or noncollege credit should get the 
approval of the Lane Change Committee and the 
Superintendent prior to taking the course (s). 
E. Verification of Credits - All credit must be 
verified by official transcripts or other evldnnce 
of the completion of the credits, acceptabla to 
the District Certification Review Committee. 00020b 
4.5.3 Lane Change Committee - A lane change committee comprised of 
one teacher from each school, one administrator and two board members 
or business administrator and Superintendent shall be established by 
the Superintendent. Their duties shall be to review all requests for 
lane changes and make recommendations to the Board for approval by 
September 30. Unit member and Superintendent shall receive written 
notice of committee's decision by October 15. 
4.5.4. Prior Approval - To ensure that planned training is 
appropriate for salary lane change credit, an individual may request 
approval prior to the starting date of training. 
4.5.5. Unacceptable Credit and Exceptions - In general, classes of 
the following nature will not be granted lane change credit: 
A. Courses of a broad general nature such as 
lecture series, forum assemblies, and survey 
courses• 
B. Work projects such as curriculum development 
committees, textbook selection committees, and 
Curriculum guide committees or other project 
designed primarily as service projects. 
4.6 Method of Payment - Unit members' salaries shall be paid in 
twelve monthly installments. The first installment shall be paid on 
the last working day of the first month, and each subsequent 
installment shall be paid on the last working day of each month 
thereafter. Unit members may elect to receive salary on a ten month 
pay schedule. 
4.6.1 Summer Pay 
Teachers may receive advance pay of their salary on July 1 if the 
teacher is terminating his/her employment with the District or taking 
an authorized leave of absence for the ensuing school year. 
This will be authorized by the business administrator upon receipt 
of a letter by May 15th requesting the summer pay. 
4.6.2. Payroll Deductions - The District shall deduct from the 
salaries of the unit members at the unit member's request, the 
following: 
* Dues to the Association 
* Premiums for Board approved health & welfare benefits 
* Tax sheltered annuities 
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* Automatic savings 
* Other appropriate and mutually agreed upon deductions. 
ARTICLE V - INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR TEACHERS 
5.1• The Park City Board of Education acknowledges that any employee 
of the school district has the right to receive certain fringe 
benefits as part of their renumeratlon for services rendered. Part of 
that renumeratlon is in the form of insurance benefits both medical 
and life which are provided by the Board of Education. 
5.1.2. The District shall fund health insurance costs for the 1989-89 
school year (except for that amount presently paid by employees for 
dependent dental coverage), up to $197/month/employee. Should health 
insurance costs increases over $197/month/employee for the 1989-90 
school year, the employee would be required to fund the increase. 
The benefits shall include medical, dental, vision, disability income 
insurance, life insurance, and presciption coverage that can be 
obtained through the premium amount of $197/month/employee. 
PCEA agrees to establish a working committee to monitor health care 
costs, to educate district employees on how to keep costs down, and to 
explore alternative health care programs for the 1989-90 school year. 
5.1.3. Any employee terminated during the course of the 
contract year for cause, or at their own volition, will receive no 
benefits beyond the last working day of the month in which the 
contract is mutually abrogated. 
ARTICLE VI - LEAVES OF ABSENCE WITH PAY 
6. . 1 Sick Leave 
6.1.1 The teacher is granted ten days sick leave annually. 
6.1.2 Unused sick leave benefits shall be cummulative during the 
period of employment for sick leave benefits, not to exceed a maximum 
of one hundred twenty (120) days. 
6.1.3 The district will pay the cost of the substitute teacher 
for days used and such days used will be deducted from the 
accumulated days of sick leave. 
6.1.4 Sick leave taken beyond that accumulated amount will result 
in a deduction of pay equal to the relationship that the day(s) absent 
represents to the total contract days. 
6.1.5. After six (6) consecutive days of absencef the principal may 
request a doctor's statement verifying such illness. 
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6.1.6 At the end of each school year, each unit member shall 
receive payment for one-tenth of their unused annual sick leave. 
(i.e. .if eight of the ten days sick leave Is not used, the teacher 
would receive 8/10 of one day's salary. 
6.2. Leave for Family Illness. - Because situations occur in which 
members of a certificated employee's immediate family may become ill, 
or involved in an accident, which requires hospitalization or 
extensive home care, the Board of Education acknowledges that 
consideration should be extended to the employee to deal with the 
situation. Up to four (4) days of the ten (10) days' sick leave as 
provided under the sick leave policy per year may be used for such 
illness or emergency in the teacher's immediate family, which requires 
the teacher to be absent from duty. 
A. The immediate family is defined by this policy as 
father, mother, husband, wife, sister, brother, son or 
daughter. 
B. This policy may include other close relatives if, and 
only if, they reside with the employee. Such relatives as 
may be considered are, grandfather, grandmother, father-in-
law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, daughter-
in-law, or son-in-law. 
C# The use of days under this policy will be deducted from 
the certificated employees sick leave. 
D. Should such 'illness or emergency exceed four (4) days, 
additional time may be granted upon approval of the 
Superintendent of Schools. 
E. This policy may, upon approval of the Superintendent be 
extended to include close relatives or non-residents where 
there is a compelling need. 
6.3. Personal Leave - Personal leave is to be taken only for 
personal matters for which the scheduling is beyond the control of the 
teacher. It is not considered vacation time. It is the professional 
responsibility of any professional people to use this leave only for 
the purpose intended, any misuse thereof, such as vacation days, would 
be considered unethical/ unprofessional, and in violation of the 
teacher' s contract. 
6.3.1. Personal Leave - Unit members may take two days per year 
with pay. 'The first day will not be deducted from the unit members' 
accumulated sick leave. 
6.3.2. Notice to the principal shall be made at least forty-eight 
(48) hours before taking such leave, except in cases of emergencies. 
6.3.3. If the reason for the personal leave is confidential, the 
teacher may so indicate on the appropriate form. 
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6.4. Bereavement Leave 
6.4.1. , In case of a death in the teacher's immediate family, full 
salary shall be allowed for not to exceed five (5) consecutive days. 
The first three days leave that a teacher may take, will be granted 
without deduction from the teacher's accumulated sick leave. If more 
than three days leave is taken, the other days, up to two, will be 
deducted from the teacher's accumulated sick leave. 
6.4.2. Immediate family shall be defined as father, mother, 
husband, wife, sister, brother, son or daughter. 
6.4.3. In case of a death in the teacher's extended family, full 
salary shall be allowed and shall not exceed three consecutive days. 
The first two of these leave days will not be deducted from the 
teacher's accumulated sick leave, but the third leave day will 
constitute a deduction from the accumulated sick leave. 
6..4.4. Extended family shall be defined as grandfather, 
grandmother, father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-
law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, grandson, granddaughter, niece, 
nephew, aunt or uncle. 
6.4.5. If, under the above and with prior written approval, because 
significant travel is involved, the Superintendent may grant up to two 
additonal leave days. Such additional days will be deducted from the 
teacher's accumulated sick leave. 
6..4.6 Under extremely unusual circumstances, upon prior written 
request, the Superintendent may grant additional leave time as may be 
needed. Any such additional leave time will be deducted from the 
employees accumulated sick leave. 
6.4.7 If an individual is on the program for a funeral, he/she 
will be given appropriate time not to exceed one (1) day for 
participation in the funeral service itself. It is expected that if 
the teacher can work a portion of the day, he/she should do so. 
6.4.8 Attendance of funerals of close personal friends will be 
handled by the teacher, principal and superintendent as may mutually 
be agreed upon. If such were to involve more than the briefest time, 
such leave would be deducted from the teacher's accumulated sick 
leave• 
6.5. Sabbatical Leave - Teachers may apply for a year's 
sabbatical leave. This leave is for the profesisonal growth of the 
individual, and a program roust be developed which indicates how that 
goal will be achieved. 
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6*5.1. A sabbatical leave may be granted to a teacher for up to one 
(1} year* 
6.5.2* In order to qualify for a sabbatical leave, the teacher will 
have successfully completed six (6) years in the Park City School 
District, 
6.5.3. The teacher will submit a written plan for his/her 
sabbatical year to the Park City Board of Education. Such plan will 
have received approval of the building principal and the 
Superintendent of Schools prior to submission to the Board of 
Education* 
6.5.4. A teacher may be awarded a sabbatical leave at seven year 
Intervals. 
6.5*5. One teacher per year maximum would be granted the 
opportunity of being on a sabbatical leave for each fifty (50) 
teachers within the district as shown on the table below: 
Number of Teachers Possible Number on Sabbatical 
1-50 1 
51-100 2 
101-150 3 
151-200 4 
6.5.6. During the sabbatical year, the teacher will receive 50% of 
the previous year's salary* 
6.5.7. Upon return to the Park City School District following the 
sabbatical year, the teacher will commit to a minimum of two (2) years 
service to the school district or will pay the entire sum of the 
salary, plus entire sum of fringe benefits paid during the sabbatical 
year to the Park City Board of Education. 
5.5.8. The district will pay the insurance premiums during the 
teacher's sabbatical year* 
6..5.9. Upon return to the Park City School District, the teacher 
will be reinstated into the appropriate lane and step, without 
granting credit for the additional sabbatical year, as a year of 
service to the district. 
6.5.10. The teacher will be offered the same position in which 
he/she was employed before the sabbatical year upon return to the 
school district. 
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6..5.11* To assure an orderly process, an application must be 
submitted not later than the following dates: 
a. January 15 - Written proposal submitted to 
principal. 
b. February 10 - Written proposal with principals approval 
submitted to the Superintendent of Schools* 
c. March 10 - (Or before to coincide with regular 
Board of Education meeting) Written proposal with 
Principal's and Superintendent's recommendation 
submitted to the Board of Education. 
d. April 1 - Approval or rejection of written 
proposal by Board of Education. 
ARTICLE VII: LEAVES OF ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY 
7.1. Professional Leave Upon recommendation of the 
Superintendent and susbsequent approval of the Board of Education, 
professional personnel may be granted a leave of absence of one (1) 
year, at no cost to the district. 
7. 1 1 Written request for a professional leave of absence must be 
sua&.irted to and acted upon by the Board of Education by April 1 or by 
the first regular Board meeting in April, prior to the academic year 
during which such leave is desired. 
7.1.2. The leave should involve a minimum of educational 
interruption. 
7.1.3. A leave is granted for one year, but may, for unusual 
reasons be extended at the end of the leave period. 
7.1.4. The unit member taking the leave must notify the school 
district by March 1 of the leave year so that the district may 
appropriately plan for his/her return for the subsequent year. During 
the time a person is on a professional leave of absence, an employee 
will be hired on a one year contract to fulfill the teaching 
obligations and assignment. 
7.1.5. Upon return to the district, the unit member will be 
employed by the district in a position for which he/she is qualified. 
7.1.6. Any college credits received by the unit member while on a 
professional leave of absence may be used toward movement across the 
lanes of the salary schedule. 
7.1.7. Experience credit for salary purposes toward a step on the 
salary schedule will not be granted for the period of time the unit 
member is on the leave. 
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7.2. Military Leave - Military leaven shall be allowed in 
accordance with federal and state laws relating to such leaves. 
ARTICLE VIII WORK SCHEDULE 
8.1. Unit Member's Workday - Full-time Employment is defined as a 
minimum of eight (8) working hours per day for at least 184 days or as 
determined by official contract. 
9.2. Calendar Committer- The district shall compose a 
District Calendar Committee comprised of district personnel, teachers, 
and Board members in establishing calendar options. Once this 
committee has formed several optional calendarn, they will be sent to 
the Association, Community Councils, and the Administration for their 
input in selecting a calendar. A goal of the committee will be to 
establish a formula for long-range calendars. The Board has the final 
decision in selecting the calendar. 
ARTICLE IX: STAFF ASSIGNMENTS (REFER TO DISTRICT POLICY 
MANUAL) 
ARTICLE X: STAFF HIRING (REFER TO DISTRICT POLICY MANUAL) 
ARTICLE XI? REDUCTION IN PROFESSIONAL STAFF (REFER TO DISTRICT POLICY 
MANUAL) 
ARTICLE XIIi PROBATION, TENURE, ORDERLY DISMISSAL 
12.1. bef irtlUoho - it is the policy of thi is %oiktA that eidh tttftfchar 
shall be required to serve a probationary period of the equivalent of 
three (3) years from the date of the first appointment within the 
district, provided that he/she teaches at least half-time. Upon 
successful completion of the probationary period, a teacher shall be 
"granted the privilege of tenure. 
12.1.1. Teacher - A teacher is any person who hold:? a standard 
professional certificate or authorization, and who is regularly 
employed by the Board of Education in a position in which a 
certficate is required by state law. A teacher may serve either on a 
full-time or part-time basis. 
12.1.2. Contract Term - The period of time for which a teacher is 
employed by the school district pursuant to a contract. 
12.1.3. Dismissal - Any termination of the status of 
employment of a teacher* It also means the failure of the school 
district to renew the contract of any teacher who, pursuant to the 
policies of the district, has a reasonable expectation of continued 
amployment in the district. 
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12.1.4. Non-renewal of Contract - This is defined as the refusal 
of the district to renew the contract of a teacher for succeeding 
school year. In the case of tenured teachers, non-renewal may result 
only for reasonable cause and upon provision for due process rights. 
In the case of probationary teachers, non-renewal may result from 
appropriate and timely notice of the Board's intent not to renew, 
without specific statement of cause or reason. 
12.1.5. Tenure - This is defined as an employment status within 
the district wherein the teacher has a reasonable expectancy of 
continued employment. 
12.1.6. Probationary Period - This is defined as an employment status 
within the district wherein the teacher is a provisional employee 
whose continued employment during the initial three years of district 
employment is at the discretion of the Board of Education; except that 
said teachers can be removed during the life of a contract only for 
cause. The probationary period provides the school district with an 
opportunity to observe and evaluate the performance of teachers to 
provide assistance to them to Improve their performance, and to make 
judgments about the long term potential of that teacher to meet the 
school district's needs, standards, and expectations. 
12.2 DISMISSAL - NON-RENEWAL 
12.2.1. The Board retains the authority to suspend an individual 
from active service pending a hearing for dismissal where it appears, 
in the judgement of district officials, that the continued presence of 
the individual in the school may be harmful to students or the 
district. 
12.2.2 At all hearings pursuant to dismissal or non-renewal after 
due notice and on demand of the educator, he/she may be represented by 
counsel, petition witnesses, hear the testimony against him/her, cross 
examine witnesses, and examine documents and evidence. Such hearings 
are to be held before the Board of Education. 
12.2.3 The unit member shall be given a timely written notice of 
the Board's findings and ruling in all such hearings, along with 
notification of his/her right to appeal the decision to the Board of 
Education• 
12.3 No teacher, whether probationary or tenure, may be dismissed 
during the life of their respective contract except for cause as set 
forth in the guidelines. 
12.3*1 Grounds for dismissal shall include: incompentency, immoral 
character, insubordination, willful neglect of duty, and 
non-compliance with the laws of the state, the published 
rules and regulations of the Local and State Board of 
Education and instructions of the Superintendent. 
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12.4 Termination of Unit Member - In cases where the district 
intends to terminate a teacher's contract during his/her contract 
term, the district shall give written notice of such intent to the 
unit member* Said notice shall be delivered in writing, served by 
personal delivery or by certified mail, addressed to the individual's 
last known address. Said notice shall be given at least 15 days prior 
to the proposed date of the termination and the reason for such 
termination. 
12.4.1 The unit member is entitled to hear any and all adult 
witnesses that he/she may choose and he/she may have legal counsel. 
12.5 Termination of Tenured Unit Member 
12.5.1 Where there is evidence of failure in professional work or 
other grounds of dismissal, herein stated, the unit member shall be 
given notice of the fact. This notice shall be given as early as 
evidence is available. The notice shall state the deficiencies and 
give assurance of providing a plan of assistance. The personnel 
responsible for giving the notice should be the principal or the 
superintendent or a person designated by the superintendent. 
12.5.2 Not later than February 1, of the school year the unit 
member whose success is being questioned shall receive in writing an 
analysis of his/her work. This shall be signed by the school 
principal or the superintendent of schools. A conference shall be 
held and a plan for assistance developed* 
12.5.3 By March 10, the unit member must receive from the 
Superintendent a written statement clearly specifying his/her status 
within the school district. This statement shall review the case and 
inform the teacher of his/her rights for a hearing before the Board of 
Education. 
12.5.4 Within 10 days after receiving the notice, the 
superintendent shall be informed of the unit member's intent to accept 
cancellation4of the contract or to request a hearing before the Board 
of Education. If the unit member elects a hearing, a time and place 
for the hearing shall be established by the superintendent and the 
unit member shall be given timely notice thereof. The President of 
the Board shall direct the hearing. 
12.5.5 Within five days and after the hearing, the unit member 
shall receive the decision of the Board. Such notice shall be in 
writing.and be signed by the President and the Clerk of the Board. 
12.5.6 If the teacher believes the decision is a violation of 
justice or that additional evidence of his/her success has become 
available, he/she may request another hearing before the Board of 
Education* The second hearing shall proceed in a manner similar to 
the first. 
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12.5.7 If a second hearing is held, the Board of Education within 
five days, shall be signed by the president and the clerk of the 
Board. The decision of the Board of Education will be final if there 
is no violation on the statues, the rules and regulation of the 
district or the unit member's contract. 
12.5.8 Nothing in this act shall be construed to preclude staff 
reduction when necessary to decrease the number of teachers because of 
decreased student enrollments in the district, because of the 
discontinuance of particular service, because of the shortage of 
anticipated revenue after the budget has been adopted, or because of 
school consolidations. 
12.6 Renewal of Contracts of Provisional Teachers 
12.6.1 Decisions involving the retention of non-retention of 
faculty, and the reward or denial of the tenure will be based on the 
premise of excellent past performance and promise of exemplary future 
performance • 
12.6.2 The general expectations include: 
a. A demonstrated mastery of subject matter and 
the ability to teach is effective. 
b. Good classroom management skills - ability to 
get maximum learning time during the class period. 
c. An ability to motivate students to engage in 
the learning process. 
d. An ability to work in a cooperative and 
collegial manner with other faculty members, 
administrators and parents. 
e. Willingness to go beyond the minimum 
requirements and put forth extra effort. 
(Specific expectations are contained in the policy 
on evaluation.) 
12.6.3 Subsequent to the appropriate recommendations from 
the building principal and the superintendent, the 
Board of Education retains the authority to refuse 
to renew the contract of any probationary teacher 
for a subsequent contract year by merely notifying 
said teacher of the Board's Intention not to 
renew, provided that said decision be in writing 
and presented to the teacher on, or before Harch 
10 of the teacher's present contract year. 
12.6.4 If not notified in writing on, or before March 10 
of the third probationary year that the contract UWJ2 
is not to be renewed, the teacher shall 
automatically become entitled to the privileges of 
tenure, 
12.6.5 Teachers in the first three years of their 
contract will be given reasons for non-renewal 
verbally by the respective principal and 
superintendent before March 10. 
12.6.6 An association member may, at the request of the 
teacher, be present at this meeting to give advice 
and support to the teacher. 
12.6.7 The reasons given to the teacher for non-renewal 
are not appealable to the Board or admissable as 
evidence in a legal action brought against the 
district except in the case of a civil rights 
violation. 
ARTICLE XIII REMEDIATION 
It is the policy of the Park City Board of Education that 
remediation efforts be provided a staff member who has been adjudged 
deficient in certain areas of competence or performance. 
13.1. It is the attitude of the Park City School District 
adminlstrattion and staff that remediation is a positive professional 
process. Remediation is not viewed as an intermediate preclude to 
dismissal of an employee. Rather, it is viewed as a process whereby 
concerned professionals join together to assist one who is in need of 
support and assistance in meeting acceptable levels of competance from 
a professional standpoint within the larger framework of a general 
faculty• 
13.2.1. Guidelines - In circumstances wherein the adminstration deems 
remediation necessary, the following guidelines shall prevail! 
13.2.2. Instances where an adminstrat1ve decision has been made that 
professional remediation is necessary, a remediation committee shall 
be established. 
13.2.3. The remediation committee shall be composed of three (3) 
members, said members to be chosen in the following manner: The 
principal shall designate one member, the staff member shall designate 
one member and the two staff members so chosen shall then, together, 
designate a third member. 
13.2.4. The purpose of the three (3) member committee Is to assist 
the administration and the staff member with the remediation process. 
This includes such areas as: 
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a. Identification and enumeration of areas of concern 
b. Ascertaining whether or not stated administrative concerns of 
staff member's performance are valid 
c. Hearing and weighing the staff member's response to the 
administrative concerns 
d. Interacting with staff member and administration to establish 
a remedial program acceptable to all 
a. Providing periodic progress reports to the staff member and 
administration during the life of the remediation process 
f. A final progress report to the staff member and 
administration concerning the effectiveness of the remediation 
proces (such reports may or may not contain a specific 
recommendation as to the need, or conversely, the lack of need 
for further action) 
g. Once the committee is created, its first task shall be to 
establish a time schedule for the remediation process 
13.2.5. The three (3) member committee is armed with the authority to 
seek expert input outside the confines of the Immediate faculty. They 
are further armed with the authority to confer with or seek input from 
any and all staff members in the building. 
13.2.6. In all cases, the final decision as to the ultimate outcome 
of the remediation process rests with the chief building 
administrator. This could include a number of courses of action, 
including: notification to the staff member that total remediation 
has been effected, along with appropriate commendation; notification 
that partial remediation has occured, along with recommendations of 
areas needing additional attention in the future; or notification of 
the failure of the remediation process, along with notice of intent to 
recommend termination. 
13.2.7. Despite the fact that the final decision in these matters 
rests with the building administrator, he/she should give greatest 
credence to the findings and recommendations of the faculty 
remediation committee• 
ARTICLE XIV BLOCK GRANT 
14.1. The district shall actively involve the Park City Education 
Association in the planning and study of the Block Grant Proposal 
during the 1988-89 and 1989-90 school years. 
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARK CITY EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : AND ORDER 
vs. : 
: Civil No. 92 CV 0019 
PARK CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 
Judge 
Defendant. : 
This matter comes before the Court on cross Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Defendant Park City School District filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in support thereof. Plaintiff Park City Education Association responded 
by filing its own Motion for Summary Judgment together with a joint memorandum in 
opposition to Defendant's motion and memorandum in support of its own motion. 
Defendant then filed a reply memorandum and the motions were submitted for 
decision with a request for oral argument. 
NO. 
FILMS 
BY
 tf £ 
The Court heard arguments by counsel on both Motions on Tuesday, August 4, 
1992. Plaintiff was represented by Robert G. Wing, attorney. Defendant was 
represented by Brinton R. Burbidge, attorney. The Court, having reviewed the 
memoranda in support of and in opposition to the respective Motions for Summary 
Judgment, and having considered the arguments of counsel, makes the following 
Findings and Conclusions of Law. 
Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of two of its members who allege they 
have incurred damages as a result of a dispute in entitlement to health insurance 
coverage. The members are Nancy Shulthess and Margery Hadden. The Plaintiffs 
claims in this matter center on the District's contractual obligations with Ms. Hadden 
and Ms. Schulthess. The undisputed facts are clear that both of these individuals 
entered into a specific contract with the Park City Board of Education for half-time 
employment. Each contract contained the following provision incorporating and 
binding the parties to District policies and procedures: 
5. The Board of Education is bound by the adopted 
rules and regulations as stipulated in the policies and 
procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be 
bound by these rules and regulations as they may be 
amended from time to time. 
Ms. Hadden and Ms. Schulthess entered into their contracts with full knowledge and 
notice of the terms of the policy affecting insurance coverage for half-time or part-time 
employees. The Board of Education adopted the policy in question prior to Ms. 
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Schulthess and Ms, Hadden signing their contracts and prior to the time they began 
their half-time duties for the 1989-1990 school year. Prior to entering their contracts 
with the District, each had notice of and/or received a copy of policy GCDA 
deteraiining entitlement to health and accident insurance coverage. Therefore, this 
policy as well as all of the policies of the District became and were part of the 
contracts between the Board of Education and Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden. 
Therefore, they are bound by the terms of this policy and are not entitled to any 
additional health or accident insurance benefits other than those provided for by that 
policy. Because both teachers contracted for only 20 hours per week, they were not 
eligible for health and accident insurance coverage under the terms of policy GCDA. 
Plaintiff argues that the individual contracts between the two of its members and 
the Board of Education are unenforceable because the members elected to have the 
Plaintiff represent them in contract negotiations. Plaintiff then argues that the Board 
of Education cannot negotiate directly with plaintiffs members and the two individual 
contracts are therefore invalid. In support of its position, Plaintiff draws analogies to 
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and its case law. However, there is no 
reference in the master contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant which can be 
interpreted as incorporating the NLRA or its resultant case law. Also, the NLRA and 
the Utah counterpart thereto are not binding upon the Defendant and do not restrict 
the Defendant's direct negotiations with Plaintiffs members. Therefore, Plaintiffs 
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claims that the individual contracts between the Board of Education and its members 
are invalid is without merit. 
Plaintiff also alleges that the Board of Education is prohibited from negotiating 
directly with Plaintiffs individual members because those members have chosen to be 
represented by the Plaintiff. However, UCA § 34-20-7 specifically provides that while 
employees have a right to bargain collectively, they also have a right not to bargain 
collectively. Individual employees may contract directly with a school district's board of 
education. Plaintiffs members, Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden signed contracts with 
the Board of Education individually. They knew that under the terms of their 
contracts, they were not entitled to any benefits and they chose to enter the contracts 
with that clear understanding. Regardless of what they now claim in retrospect, the 
signed and executed contracts between Ms. Schulthess, Ms. Hadden, and the Board of 
Education are clear evidence of the contract and agreement with the Board. 
Plaintiff also argues that the master contract by its own terms takes precedence 
over Board policies which conflict with the provisions of the master contract. Plaintiff 
argues that policy GCDA cannot be binding upon its members because the master 
contract conflicts with the policy. Such a contractual provision would prevent the 
Board of Education from amending its policies regarding benefits, compensation, 
personnel, termination, and many other provisions, thus taking away the Board's ability 
to properly and responsibly manage its affairs according to statutory requirements and 
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standards. Moreover, such a provision would be an unlawful limitation on the Board's 
legislative authority. The Board of Education cannot be precluded from amending its 
policies, adopting additional policies, or rescinding existing policies. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that policy GCDA, regarding benefits for part-
time employees of the Board of Education, was in force at the time that Ms. 
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden entered their individual contracts with the Board. 
Individual employees of the school district are bound by policies adopted by the Board 
of Education. The contracts between Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden and the Board 
of Education are enforceable. 
Thus, there being no genuine issues of material fact and it appearing that 
Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. This Court hereby ORDERS that the plaintiff Park City Education 
Association's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, defendant Park City School 
District's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and plaintiffs Complaint is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, each party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this $ ^ d a y of J^ tetofeef; 1992. 
BY THE CQ 
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AN ACT RELATING TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS; PROVIDING FOR A CENTENNIAL SCHOOLS 
PROGRAM; ESTABLISHING CRITERIA FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM; 
PROVIDING DEFINITIONS; PROVIDING FOR AN APPLICATION AND SELECTION 
PROCESS; PROVIDING A $2,600,000 APPROPRIATION FOR THE PROGRAM; 
H. B. No. 100 
PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOOL DIRECTORS AT CENTENNIAL 
SCHOOLS, EMPOWERED BY LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS TO MAKE DECISIONS AT THE 
SCHOOL LEVEL; PROVIDING FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE STATE OFFICE OF 
EDUCATION AND COLLABORATION WITH HIGHER EDUCATION; AND PROVIDING AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
ENACTS: 
53A-la-3Ql, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
53A-la-302, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
53A-la-303, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
53A-la-304, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 53A-la-301, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
to read: 
Part 3. Centennial Schools Program 
53A-la-301. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Centennial School11 means a public school selected to 
participate in the program authorized under this part* 
(2) "Delegation document" means a document adopted by a local school 
board that delegates to school directors the authority to make decisions 
at the school level on teacher career ladders, technology in the 
classroom, class size reduction, and any other areas related to strategic 
planning at the school level that are specifically outlined in the 
document* The delegation document shall designate the school directors. 
H. B. m. 100 
If the community council is not designated as the school directors, then 
the composition of the directorship shall be similar to that of the 
council, but in either case at least 1/3 of the school directors shall be 
teachers at the school. 
(3) "School directors" means the group of individuals empowered by a 
school district delegation document to implement a centennial school 
program at a public elementary or secondary school. The school directors 
may be the same group authorized as a comnrunitv council under Section 
53A-ia-i08. 
(4) "Site-based decision making" means a joint planning and problem 
solving process that seeks to improve the quality of working life and 
education* It is a cooperative effort in which a local school community 
group comprised of teachers, classified employees, school administrators, 
and parents of students engage in collabarative decision making at the 
school level on matters critical to the achievement of school goals 
established by the group* 
Section 2. Section 53A-U-302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
to read: 
53A-la-302« Establishment of Centennial Schools Program 
Qualifications for participation. 
(1) There is established a Centennial Schools Program to assist the 
state's public schools in accomplishing the mission of public education 
outlined in Section 53A-la-103. 
(2) Participation in the program is on a voluntary basis and subject 
H. B. No. 100 
(a) the execution of a delegation document between a local board of 
education and the school directors at the applicant school; 
(b) adoption bv the school board of the district in which the 
applicant school is located of accountability procedures related to the 
authority delegated to the school directors at the applicant school, 
which may be included as part of the delegation document; 
(c) the development and implementation of a program by the applicant 
school that integrates technology into its curriculum, instruction, and 
student assessment; 
(d) the implementation of a strategic planning process bv the 
applicant school in which the school has: 
(i) defined clearly articulated performance goals for students at 
the school and devised a means for evaluating those goals; 
(ii) established strategies to involve business and industry at the 
school through partnerships or adoption programs; 
(iii) determined to focus on the totality of the student, which may 
involve collaborative services from other state and local agencies such 
as Health, Human Services, and the Juvenile Courts; 
(iv) provided for extensive involvement by parents of students at 
the school in developing a personalized education plan or personalized 
education occupation plan for each student at the school; and 
(v) designed a program to include the basics of education as well as 
higher learning skills in its development of curriculum and considered 
new instructional designs to facilitate learning, such as integrated 
H. B. No, 100 
studies, csen schedules, easy access and exit from course offerings, fine 
arcs integration, and optimum use of instructional time. 
(3) (a) The school directors may request a waiver from the local 
board of education of any provision in an agreement or contract between 
the district and its employees that prevents or hinders the school from 
achieving its performance goals. 
(b) The waiver is subject to agreement between the local board and 
the entity that represented the employees in obtaining the agreement or 
contract referred to in Subsection (a). 
Section 3. Section 53A-la-3Q3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
to read: 
53A-la-303. Selection process — Appropriation. 
(1) The State Board of Education in collaboration with the 
governorfs office shall select the schools to participate in the 
Centennial Schools Program. 
(2) (a) The State Board of Education through the State Office of 
Education shall establish application deadlines for participation in the 
program. 
(b) The local school board of the district in which the applicant 
school is located shall review and approve the schoolfs application prior 
to its submission to the state board. 
(3) (a) The state board and the governor's office shall give 
consideration to the need for a broad selection of schools to participate 
in the program. 
H. B. No. 100 
(b) The total number of schools participating in the program during 
its first year may not exceed 200, unless the Legislature provides a 
specific supplemental appropriation in addition to the amounts authorized 
under this part. 
(4) (a) There is appropriated for fiscal year 1993-94 $2,600,000 
from the Uniform School Fund to the State Board of Education to implement 
the Centennial Schools Program authorized under this part. 
(b) The board, through the State Office of Education, shall 
administer and distribute the appropriation in the following manner: 
(i) each school participating in the program shall receive $5,000 as 
a base allocation; 
(ii) each school shall receive an additional S20 per student based 
on the school's average daily membership for the 1992-93 school year. 
(c) Monies appropriated for the program are nonlapsing. 
(d) A participating school may reapply for an allocation in each 
succeeding year to assist in accomplishing its performance goals* 
(5) (a) The appropriation authorized in this section is the 
appropriation referred to for centennial schools in Title 53A, Chapter 
17a, Minimum School Program Act. 
(b) Participant schools are encouraged to: 
(i) supplement their allocation with monies they may have access to 
under other programs authorized in Title 53A and Title 63, such as 
experimental and developmental programs, site-based decision-making pilot 
programs, class size reduction programs, Educational Technology 
H. B. No- 100 
Initiative programs, and Coordinated Services for Children and Youth At 
Risk programs; and 
(ii) focus and build on innovative projects and practices currently 
being used in certain schools within the state as oart of their strategic 
planning. 
(6) (a) A centennial school may use its allocation for any purpose 
designated in its delegation document so long as the use does not put the 
school out of compliance with state or federal lav or federal 
regulations. 
(b) The school may not use its allocation for administrative costs. 
Section 4. Section 53A-la-304, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
to read: 
53A-la-304, Assistance from state board ~ Collaboration with higher 
education — Report. 
(1) The State Board of Education through the State Office of 
Education shall provide services, upon request, to any school or school 
directors that require its assistance to participate in the program 
established under this part* 
(2) The State Board of Regents shall adopt policies for the state's 
public colleges of education to use centennial schools as on-site 
professional development centers offering oreservice programs for 
teachers and administrators* 
(3) (a) Each school and group of school directors participating in 
the program shall annually review and report the schoolfs progress and 
H. B. No. 100 
achievements under the program pursuant to guidelines established bv the 
State Board of Education. 
(b) The reporting requirement may be satisfied in the school 
district performance report reauired in Section 53A-la-lQ9 or 53A-3-602. 
Section 5. Sunset date. 
The Centennial Schools Program authorized under this part shall 
terminate June 30, 1996, unless otherwise continued bv the Legislature. 
Section 6. Effective Date. 
This act takes effect on July 1, 1993. 
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION ACT 
1993 
GENERAL SESSION 
Enrolled Copy 
H. 8. No. 396 By 0. D. Camahan 
AN ACT RELATING TO PUBLIC EDUCATION; PROVIDING A METHOD OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION FOR CERTIFICATED EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS; 
PROVIDING FOR APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR; AND PROVIDING FOR A HEARING 
PROCESS IN THE EVENT A MEDIATOR CANNOT RESOLVE THE DISPUTE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
ENACTS: 
53A-6-401, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
53A-6-402, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Secti on 53A~6—401> Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
to read: 
Part 4. Dispute Resolution 
53A-6-401. Mediation of contract negotiations. 
(1) The president of a professional local organization which 
represents a majority of the certificated employees of a school district 
or the chairman of a local school board may, after-negotiating for 90 
days, declare an impasse bv written notification to the other party and 
to the State Board of Education. 
(2) The partv declaring the imoasse "nav recuest che scate 
suoerincendent of public instruction to aoooir.c a mediator for che 
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purpose of helping to resolve the impasse if the parties to the dispute 
have not been able to agree on a third partv mediator. 
(3) Within five working days after receipt of the written request, 
the state superintendent shall appoint a mediator who is mutually 
acceptable to the local school board and professional organization 
representing a majority of the certificated employees. 
(4) The mediator shall meet with the parties, either jointly or 
separately, and attempt to settle the impasse. 
(5) The mediator may not without the consent of both parties make 
findings of fact or recommend terms for settlement. 
(6) Both parties shall equally share the costs of mediation. 
(7) Nothing in this section prevents the parties from adopting a 
written mediation procedure other than that provided in this section, 
(3) If the parties have a mediation procedure, they shall follow 
that procedure. 
Section 2. Section 53A-6-402, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted 
to read: 
53A-6-402. Appointment of hearing officer — Hearing process. 
(1) If a mediator appointed under Section 53A-1-4Q1 is unable to 
effect settlement of the controversy within 15 working days after his 
appointment, either party to the mediation may bv written notification to 
the other party and to the state superintendent of public instruction 
request that their dispute be submitted to a hearing officer who shall 
make findings of fact and recommend terms of settlement. 
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(2) Within five working days after receipt of the request, the state 
superintendent of public instruction shall appoint a hearing officer who 
is mutually acceptable to the local school board and professional 
organization representing a majority of the certificated employees. 
(3) The hearing officer may not, without consent of both parties, be 
the same person who served as mediator. 
(4) The hearing officer shall meet with the parties, either jointly 
or separately, mav make inquiries and investigations, and may issue 
subpoenas for the production of persons or documents relevant to all 
issues in dispute. 
(5) The State Board of Education and departments, divisions, 
authorities, bureaus, agencies, and officers of the state, local school 
boards, and the professional organization shall furnish the hearing 
officer, on request, all relevant records, documents, and information in 
their possession. 
(6) If the final positions of the parties are not resolved before 
the hearing ends, the hearing officer shall prepare a written report 
containing the agreements of the parties with respect to all resolved 
negotiated contract issues and the positions that the hearing officer 
considers appropriate on ail unresolved final positions of the parties. 
(7) The hearing officer shall submit the report to the parties 
privately within ten working days after the conclusion of the hearing or 
within the date established for the submission of post-hearing briefs, 
but not later than 20 working days after the hearing officer's 
appointment. 
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(8) Either the hearing officer, che exclusive representative, or che 
local board mav make Che report oublic if Che dispute is not seeded 
within ten working days after its receipt from the hearing officer. 
(9) (a) The state superintendent of public instruction may determine 
the majority status of any professional organization which requests 
assistance under this section. 
(b) The decision of the superintendent is final unless it is clearly 
inconsistent with che evidence. 
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